[2009] FWA 290

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FAIR WORK AUSTRALIA

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.229 - Application for a bargaining order

Total Marine Services Pty Ltd
v
Maritime Union of Australia, The
(B2009/10505)

COMMISSIONER THATCHER

SYDNEY, 16 SEPTEMBER 2009

Application for bargaining orders – whether good faith bargaining requirements met by union

[1] Total Marine Services Pty Ltd (TMS) has applied to Fair Work Australia (FWA) under s.229 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) for bargaining orders under s.230 of the Act.

[2] The application is in relation to negotiations between TMS and the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) for a proposed enterprise agreement to replace the Total Marine Services Pty Ltd – Integrated Ratings, Cooks, Caterers and Seafarers Agreement 2006-2009.

[3] The orders TMS seeks is that the MUA provide it with:

[4] Section 230 (When FWA may make a bargaining order) relevantly prescribes:

[5] The good faith bargaining requirements referred to in subparagraph 230(3)(a)(i) are prescribed in s.228 as follows:

[6] There is no dispute that TMS and the MUA are each bargaining representatives 1 for a proposed enterprise agreement or that the application for the bargaining order has been made under s.229 (Applications for bargaining orders).

[7] Rather, the contest between the parties is whether the MUA has not met, or is not meeting, the good faith bargaining requirements in paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of s.228(1).

[8] The TMS submissions may be summarised as:

[9] The MUA submits that:

[10] Section 18 of Part 5 (Effect of conduct engaged in while bargaining for WR Act collective agreement) of the Fair Work (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009 provides that FWA in deciding whether it is reasonable in all the circumstances to make a bargaining order in relation to a proposed agreement, may take into account conduct engaged in by the bargaining representative while bargaining for a collective agreement under the Workplace Relations Act 1996.

Evidence

[11] Evidence on behalf of TMS was given by Mr Michael Llewellyn, Industrial Relations and Business Development Manager, TMS.

[12] No witnesses were called by the MUA.

[13] In paragraphs 13 to 34 of my decision of 1 September 2009, 3 which made an order that the MUA hold a protected action ballot of employees to be covered by the proposed enterprise agreement, I outlined the discussions and negotiations between the parties from 18 November 2008 up until 3 August 2009.

[14] In these proceedings I adopt those findings (not being persuaded otherwise by the evidence or submissions), with the addition of the following:

[15] Subsequent to the MUA lodging its application for a protected action ballot order on 31 July 2009, on 3 August 2009 TMS responded to Mr Tracey’s request of 28 July 2009 for a list of available dates to continue negotiations. The TMS letter stated that:

[16] On 6 August 2009 (after the protected action ballot order proceedings in FWA had commenced) Mr Tracey emailed Mr Llewellyn as follows:

[17] In a letter dated 7 August 2009 9 Mr Llewellyn formally responded to Mr Tracey. After advising that TMS considered Mr Tracey’s email to have been prompted by his evidence in the FWA proceedings and that TMS did not wish to pre-empt FWA’s determination of the application, he indicated that:

and concluded:

[18] On 14 August 2009 Mr Tracey emailed his response 10 which expressed concern about TMS confusion on where the parties were at in the negotiations. Further, he:

[19] In Mr Llewellyn’s response to Mr Tracey on 17 August 2009 11 he:

[20] In respect of the ‘full details for all of the MUA claims’, the TMS letter stated:

[21] On 20 August 2009 (after an initial exchange of emails between Messrs Tracey and Llewellyn 12) Mr Tracey emailed Mr Llewellyn,13 expressing the view that Mr Llewellyn had misinterpreted much of Mr Tracey’s email of 14 August and the 22 page TMS log of claims. Rather than continue an exchange of emails, he proposed a meeting to work through the MUA’s 22 page log and TMS claims on the MUA. Certain dates were proposed.

[22] Later that day, Mr Llewellyn emailed his response to Mr Tracey, 14 reiterating TMS request that it be provided with details of the MUA claims and the MUA response to the TMS draft agreement. He queried why the MUA appeared to be seeking to delay providing the information.

[23] In his email response to Mr Llewellyn later that night, 15 Mr Tracey stated that the delay was being caused by the TMS refusal to meet to discuss the proposed agreement. He referred to the MUA requests to meet and stated that, despite these, there had been no meeting since 23 June 2009. He foreshadowed that, if TMS did not advise a date for a meeting, the MUA would seek a bargaining order.

[24] On 21 August 2009, the hearing of the MUA application for a protected action ballot order concluded. Also on that day, TMS lodged its application for bargaining orders.

[25] On 24 August 2009, the MUA lodged an application for a bargaining order that TMS meet with the MUA and negotiate in good faith.

[26] Also on 24 August 2009, Mr Llewellyn emailed Mr Tracey 16 with advice that TMS was prepared to meet once the MUA provided sufficient detail of its claims to enable TMS to cost, and therefore properly consider, the claims.

[27] On 25 August 2009, for procedural reasons the MUA withdrew its application dated 24 August 2009 and lodged a further application for a bargaining order that TMS meet with the MUA and negotiate in good faith.

[28] Also on 25 August 2009, Mr Tracey emailed Mr Llewellyn 17 in the following terms:

[29] Later that day Mr Llewellyn emailed Mr Bray 18 in terms of the following:

[30] On 27 August 2009, Mr Bray emailed Mr Llewellyn 19 and proposed that the meeting occur on 4 September 2009.

[31] Later that day, Mr Llewellyn’s email to Mr Tracey and Mr Bray 20 included:

[32] On 28 August 2009 Mr Tracey emailed his response to Mr Llewellyn’s letter of 17 August 2009, 21 which indicated:

[33] On 31 August 2009,  22 Mr Llewellyn advised Mr Tracey, in effect, that he disagreed with most of his email of 28 August 2009. After repeating the substance of his email of 20 August 2009, Mr Llewellyn’s email outlined the following areas of concern and sought they be dealt with prior to the meeting on 4 September:

[34] On Tuesday 1 September 2009 the MUA withdrew its application for a bargaining order, given that the parties had agreed to a number of meetings commencing that Friday.

[35] Therefore the hearing of the TMS application for bargaining orders occurred in the context that the parties were to meet the following day and had agreed to meet weekly for a further 3 weeks.

CONSIDERATION

[36] Section 230 provides FWA with a discretion to grant an application for a bargaining order if the requirements of paragraphs 230(1)(a), (b) and (c) apply. Specifically, the application must have complied with the Act, the requirements of s.230 must be met and FWA must be satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to make the order.

[37] The requirements of s.230(3) include that FWA must be satisfied that a bargaining representative has not met or is not meeting the good faith bargaining requirements in s.228. The reference to the present is to the time of making or determining the application.

[38] Whether a bargaining representative has not met, or is not meeting the good faith bargaining requirements necessitates the application of s.228 to the conduct and performance of the representative according to the established facts, which are to be determined by reference to all of the circumstances of the particular case. Fact finding, therefore, is an essential element in the decision required by subparagraph 230(3)(a)(i).

[39] The requirements in paragraph 230(1)(c) and s.230(3) that FWA be satisfied of prescribed matters each involve the exercise of a discretion.

[40] In applying the provisions, I will adopt ‘an even handed assessment of the industrial context, of demands, conduct, and character of the negotiators and negotiations, in which it becomes an issue’ – which is similar to the approach used by the Full Bench in Re: Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, 23 when applying the ‘genuinely trying to reach an agreement’ test. That decision noted a similar emphasis upon the assessment of circumstances, context, and reasonableness in decisions dealing with what it regarded as the analogous concepts of bargaining in good faith in United States industrial jurisprudence.

[41] Each requirement of the good faith bargaining requirements involves matters of degree. Therefore how stringently should the requirements be applied?

[42] Consideration may be given to extrinsic material not forming part of an Act that is capable of assisting in ascertaining the meaning of a provision, taking into account its context in that Act and the purpose or object underlying that Act. 24 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2008, when dealing with what was to become s.228 of the Act, states:

[43] It will be noted from the above that:

[44] Before applying each of the applicable requirements in s.228 to the conduct and performance of the MUA according to the facts outlined in paragraphs 13 to 34 above, it is necessary to consider the circumstances surrounding such conduct and performance, including the industrial context and the character of the negotiators and negotiations.

[45] Most of the conduct and performance of the parties has occurred within circumstances that include:

[46] Given all of the circumstance of the case, I do not consider the conduct and performance of the MUA (or TMS for that matter) as bargaining in bad faith. Rather, it could simply be a struggle (within the context of various other agendas) between:

[47] The extent and nature of the correspondence that has been exchanged between the parties since they last met on 23 June 2009, gives the appearance that at least some of what has been written has been self-serving.

[48] Findings by FWA on whether good faith bargaining requirements are met, and indeed the terms of bargaining orders made by FWA, can never be a sufficient substitute for the good will between negotiating parties that is necessary to expedite enterprise bargaining in tense environments.

[49] I will now address the question of whether I am satisfied under subparagraph 230(3)((a)(i) in relation to each of the requirements in s.228(1) relied on by TMS. In doing so, I have noted that the wording of those provisions has been described as ‘generally self-explanatory’. 25

[50] In respect of paragraph 228(1)(b), on the evidence and given the surrounding circumstances, I am not satisfied that the MUA has not disclosed and is not disclosing relevant information to TMS in a timely manner.

[51] Whilst Mr Tracey probably intended that matters which were agreed at the industry level would become the basis for enterprise negotiations, AMMA’s response to the MUA’s industry log of claims lacks detail and needs to be informed by discussion. Mr Tracey’s comments in blue type should be considered in that light.

[52] Reliance only on the written correspondence between the parties may make TMS feel that the detail of the MUA’s claims is a little bit like trying to pick up a whisper in a breeze. 26 However the MUA does not rely only on such correspondence. Rather, for some time the union has been seeking a meeting with TMS without success.

[53] Notwithstanding the inconsistencies that TMS considers are contained within the revised 119 items in the MUA’s TMS log of claims, that document, when considered along with other information provided by the MUA (including its clarification of general wage increases, that it seeks a fresh approach to vessel schedules and its additional column to the construction claim table), is sufficient at this stage for the parties to meet and give consideration to the proposed agreement. Written detail to an extent similar to what TMS has sought on its construction claim (refer to paragraph 20 above) in respect of each of the 119 items seems excessive and oppressive.

[54] Speaking generally, the MUA does not need to explain why it has withdrawn certain claims, although such information may help inform negotiations.

[55] In respect of paragraph 228(1)(c), on the evidence and given the surrounding circumstances, I am not satisfied that the MUA has not responded and is not responding to proposals made by TMS in a timely manner.

[56] This assessment has not been made without doubt, as I accept that the MUA has not indicated to TMS whether it has agreed or rejected the tracked changes contained in the draft agreement which TMS forwarded on 2 June 2009. However the MUA has made several requests to meet for the purpose of discussion. Further, on 14 August 2009 the MUA provided the 22 page TMS log of claims which ‘responded to’ items in the TMS tracked changes draft agreement. Also, on 14 August 2009 and 28 August 2009 the MUA sought clarification from TMS on what was intended after listing what it understood were the matters – to which it is yet to receive a response. In the circumstances, it is probably more productive at this stage to discuss those items more generally and in concert with discussions on the MUA claims, rather than drilling into the detail of items that may not eventuate.

[57] In respect of paragraph 228(1)(d), on the evidence and given the surrounding circumstances, I am not satisfied that the MUA has not given, and is not giving, genuine consideration to the TMS proposals, and has not given or is not giving reasons for the MUA’s responses to those proposals.

[58] This item also refers to the TMS tracked changes draft agreement and therefore comments similar to those made in respect of paragraph 230(1)(c) apply. There was no evidence that the MUA has not given genuine consideration to the TMS proposals (although there was little evidence that it had) and there was no evidence that the MUA would not give this further consideration once TMS has responded to its requests. Further the MUA had indicated that it would agree to items in the MUA’s industry log of claims which AMMA had advised were agreed to by industry representatives. It can be inferred from the MUA’s various requests for meetings that it intended giving reasons for its position (including its response to the tracked changes in the TMS draft agreement) at such meetings.

[59] Under paragraph 228(1)(e), the good faith bargaining requirement is to refrain from capricious or unfair conduct that undermines freedom of association or collective bargaining. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2008 stated that such requirement:

[60] In respect of paragraph 228(1)(e), on the evidence and given the surrounding circumstances, I am not satisfied that the MUA has not refrained and is not refraining from capricious or unfair conduct that undermines freedom of association or collective bargaining.

[61] I am far from satisfied that the TMS log of claims was draft by the MUA with the intention of including inconsistencies or that the union has been deliberately seeking to misrepresent AMMA’s position in order to gain some advantage.

[62] If items in the TMS log of claims were considered during the previous industry level discussions, including those that occurred during Mr Llewellyn’s absence, it is not unreasonable for TMS to seek the assistance of AMMA on those matters, rather than requiring the MUA to start from scratch.

[63] After applying the good faith bargaining requirements of s.228(1) as a whole to the conduct and performance of the MUA according to the established facts and taking into account all of the circumstances of this case, in my opinion the MUA has done enough at this stage to meet those requirements. Therefore I am not satisfied under s.230(3) and the requirements referred to in paragraph 230(1)(b) are not met.

[64] In any event, in relation to paragraph 230(1)(c), I am not satisfied that it is reasonable in all of the circumstances to make the orders sought. I consider such orders inappropriate for the purpose of promoting the efficient and fair conduct of bargaining between the MUA and TMS for the proposed enterprise agreement. As I stated in my decision of 1 September 2009, in my experience with industrial negotiations, an absence of detail at this stage of the bargaining process is not unusual. This is particularly the case in relation to the level of written detail sought by TMS in its letter of 17 August 2009 on each item. Considering that the parties have not met since 23 June 2009, my comments are still apposite to current circumstances.

[65] In the particular circumstances of this case, in my opinion each of the orders sought would require the MUA to provide a significant amount of written detail that may not be required after the parties have met and each has clarified its various claims, options and preferences. Those meetings are planned.

[66] It is often said that the devil is in the detail, and certainly this can be true of industrial negotiations. There may well come a stage in the negotiations where it is reasonable that significant detail is required of the MUA in writing. However in my view that stage has not, as yet, been reached.

[67] After considering these proceedings I am optimistic that the four planned weekly meetings between the parties will progress negotiations beyond the stand-off which appears to have developed. If I have any reservation about that being the case, it is as a consequence of the following evidence of Mr Llewellyn in relation to the meeting which was to occur between the parties on the following day:

[68] As the requirements of s.230(1) do not apply, the discretion of FWA therein has not been enlivened and the application must be refused. I order accordingly.

[69] During the proceedings the MUA indicated its willingness to participate in conciliation with FWA and TMS if the Tribunal was troubled by any of the conduct of the union. 28 FWA is, of course, available to deal with applications pursuant to s.240 (Application for FWA to deal with a bargaining dispute).

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

Mr Caperz with Ms L D’Ascanio for Total Marine Services

Mr A Slevin for the MUA

Hearing details:

2009

Perth

September 3

 1   s.176(1).

 2   PN447.

 3   [2009] FWA 187.

 4   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML7.

 5   Exhibit C1, para 49.

 6   Exhibit C1, paras 56 & 60.

 7   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML19.

 8   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML20.

 9   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML21.

 10   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML3.

 11   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML22.

 12   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML23 ( Mr Tracey’s email to Mr Llewellyn dated 18 August 2009) & Exhibit C1, Appendix ML24 (Mr Llewellyn’s email to Mr Tracey dated 19 August 2009).

 13   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML25.

 14   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML26.

 15   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML27.

 16   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML29.

 17   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML30.

 18   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML31.

 19   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML32.

 20   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML33.

 21   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML34.

 22   Exhibit C1, Appendix ML35.

 23   PR928033, 11 March 2003, per Munro J, Leary DP and O’Connor C, at para 46.

 24   Paragraph 15AB(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. Subparagraph 15AB(2)(e) of that Act provides that the material that may be considered includes any Explanatory Memorandum relating to the Bill containing the provision.

 25   Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Bill 2008, para 951.

 26   PN653.

 27   PN298-PN300.

 28   PN644-PN645.




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